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Commentators have questioned whether trade secret law is adequate to
protect innovative technologies. This attitude stems from seemingly
inconsistent judicial opinions in the application of trade secret law to
new technology. The authors suggest that inconsistent results are the
product of courts' separate treatment of the "property" and "misap-
propriation" aspects of trade secret law. To remedy this inconsistency
and render trade secret law a reasonably predictable protection for
new technologies, the authors propose that in evaluating trade secret
cases, courts should employ a framework which recognizes and facili-
tates the balance of policies underlying trade secret law.
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INTRODUCTION
The development of new technologies and their applications
is a high cost, high risk proposition. Such industry can thrive,
therefore, only in a legal climate which will allow the cost and
risk of research and development to be shared, and which pro-
vides the protections necessary to ensure that those investing
their resources will have a fair opportunity to reap the full ben-
efits of their entrepreneurial activities.
As a matter of federal constitutional law, Congress is
charged with promoting the progress of science and the useful
arts by securing to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries for a limited period of
time.I Congress has done so principally by enacting the patent
and copyright laws. 2 Both the patent and copyright systems
use uniform standards to promote invention while preserving
free competition and the spread of information. 3 Within the
past few years, Congress has acted to directly encourage the
sharing of research and development costs and risks4 and, in
limited areas, has also enacted legislation aimed specifically at
protecting proprietary interests in particular technologies.
5
Detailed statutory systems with uniform and relatively rigid
standards have one significant shortcoming. They lack the
flexibility which is generally necessary to keep pace with tech-
nological advance. As a result, courts have repeatedly found
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. The first federal patent and copyright laws were enacted in 1790, Act of Apr.
10, 1790, ch. VII, I Stat. 109. In tie I 950s, Congress made a total revision of the
nation's patent laws. Act ofJuly 19, 1952, Pub. I. No. 593. ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.): see also Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620. tit. III, 98 Stat. 3348 (to be codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 901-914) (Stipp. II 1984) Ihercinafter cited as the SCPA of' 19841; The
Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. I. No. 94-553. tit. 1, 90 Stat. 2541-2602 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
3. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiflel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964).
4. See National Cooperat.ive Research Act of 1984. Pll). I. No. 98-462, 98 Stat.
1815 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305).
5. See SCPA of 1984. supra note 2.
[Vol. 12
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TRADE SECRETS
themselves unable to afford protection under the patent and
copyright laws to those at the vanguard of developing new and
valuable technologies. 6 Protection of new technology under
the patent and copyright laws has often had to await amend-
ment of those laws by the slow process of congressional delib-
eration. 7 Experience thus shows that Congress cannot provide
the full protection necessary.
Computer software provides an excellent case study. The
electronic digital computer made its debut in 1946, and shortly
thereafter, came the advent of computer software. The impor-
tance of this new technology was immediately apparent, and by
the mid-1960's, computer software was becoming a valuable
commodity. By the mid-1970's, it was clear that computer
software, not hardware, was where many of the most valuable
contributions to the art would occur. It was not until 1980,
however, that Congress amended the copyright laws to extend
coverage to computer programs.8 Congress has not yet
amended the patent laws to define the extent to which com-
puter software may be patentable subject matter. 9'
Although there was virtually no federal law to protect com-
puter software against misappropriation by competing inter-
ests prior to 1980, state trade secret laws did serve reasonably
6. Cf Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421
(1984) (unsuccessful attempt to impose liability for copyright infringement upon dis-
tributor of video cassette recorders). Copyright protection does not extend to ideas,
procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles or dis-
coveries embodied in the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Issuance ofa patent
does not guarantee validity and requires disclosure of the underlying discovery. 35
U.S.C. § 112.
7. Cf Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. For a review of the historical development of copy-
right law, see Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 779
(C.D. Cal. 1983). In the view of some commentators, such enactments may even
come too late to serve the purpose for which they are most needed. See also Raskind,
Reverse Engineering, 'tifair Competition and lFair I(e, 70 MINN. L. REV. 385, 414-15
(1985) (implying that the SCPA of 1984 was developed too late to shield domestic
producers from the Japanese capture of the Random Access Memory (RAM) market).
8. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. I.. No. 96-517, § 10(a)-(6), 90 Stat. 2541, 2565
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)).
9. Patentability has instead been left to the courts. The United States Supreme
Court's acceptance of the patentability of computer software began in 1981. See Dia-
mond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); U.S. 1)DEPARTMEN-r OF COMMERCE PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAl. OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 2100-2 (5th ed.
1983) (section 2110, Patentahle Subject Matter - Mathematical, Algorithms or Coni-
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well to protect proprietary interests in computer software.' In
fact, trade secret law has often proven to be the only body of
intellectual property law available to sort out competing public
and private interests and thereby define the level of protection
to be afforded new types of technical information. While one
can expect this to be equally true in the future, some commen-
tators have questioned whether trade secret law is adequate to
the task. "
This Article addresses the ability of trade secret law to bal-
ance competing public and private interests in newly devel-
oped technical information. First, it reviews the policy
interests underlying trade secret law. Second, the Article dis-
cusses the capability of courts to understand new technology
well enough to resolve technical trade secret claims. Third,
the existing framework of trade secret law is reviewed, fol-
lowed by an examination of problems in the application of
trade secret law under that framework. Finally, the Article pro-
poses a new framework for applying trade secret law. The au-
thors conclude that trade secret law can serve as a flexible and
yet reasonably uniform and predictable means of protecting le-
gitimate interests in new technology, provided that courts recog-
nize and maintain the delicate balance of policies underlying
the law of trade secrets.
I. THE POLICY INTERESTS UNDERLYING TRADE SECRET LAW
Just what are the policy interests sought to be served by the
law of trade secrets? The comments to the Restatement (First) of
Torts suggest that the sole purpose of trade secret law is to pro-
tect against breach of faith and the use of reprehensible means
of learning another's secret.1 2 This view has also been es-
poused by some courts.lI" In order to fully appreciate the sub-
10. See, e.g., Universal Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518
(5th Cir. 1974); Corn-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229
(E.D. Mich. 1971), aJfd 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972); Structural Dynamics Research
Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich.
1975); Belth v. Insurance l)ep'. 95 Misc. 2d 18, 406 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1977).
11. See, e.g., Note, Balanci4g Employers" "lade Secret Iuterests in Higi-Tech l lgr Prod-
ucts Against Employees' Rights and Public Intlerests In .llimesota, 69 MINN. L. REV. 984,
1005 (1985).
12. RESTATEMENT (FIRsr) OF loRTS § 757 comment h (1939).
13. See Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 377 Mass. 159, 165, 385 N.E.2d
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tie intricacies of trade secret law, however, one must
understand that there are several, often conflicting policies
that come into play. These policies have shaped the law con-
cerning not only the type of information which can qualify as a
trade secret, but also the type of conduct which will be deemed
misappropriation.
While the Restatement expressly rejects the notion that en-
couraging invention is one of the interests behind trade secret
law,' 4 its trade secret "test" implicitly recognizes that very pol-
icy. Under the Restatement, certain types of confidential infor-
mation cannot qualify as trade secrets. Even though treated as
confidential, information relating to single or ephemeral
events in the conduct of a business cannot constitute trade
secrets. Examples include the amount or other terms of a se-
cret bid for a contract, the salary of certain employees, the se-
curity investments made or contemplated, or the date fixed for
the announcement of a new policy or for bringing out a new
model. 15 In order to qualify as a trade secret under the Restate-
ment, information must be in the nature of a "formula, pattern,
device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain advan-
tage over competitors which do not know or use it."16
The factors suggested by the Restatement for evaluating
whether secret information qualifies for trade secret protection
specifically involve considerations which encourage inven-
tion.' 7 The only rational basis for distinguishing between
trade secret information and other confidential business infor-
mation is that the latter does not involve effort, expense, or
innovation. Thus, as stated by the United States Supreme
Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 18 "[t]he maintenance of
standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of in-
vention are the broadly stated policies behind trade secret
14. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. In addition to factors which pertain to secrecy, the Restatement (First) of
Torts suggests that the following factors should also be considered in deciding
whether information is a plaintiffs trade secret:
(4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the
amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information;
[and] (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.
Id.
18. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
19861
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law." 19
Like the patent and copyright laws, trade secret law is not
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Re-
ward to the owner is of secondary consideration. 2) The limited
grant of monopoly under the copyright and patent laws 21 is
premised principally upon a belief that "[t]he productive effort
thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through
the introduction of new products and processes of manufac-
ture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased
employment and better lives for our citizens." 22 The ultimate
objectives of trade secret protection against industrial espio-
nage and breach of confidence are substantially the same. 23
Unlike the patent and copyright laws, however, trade secret
law does not purport to grant even the most enterprising in-
ventor a monopoly in his trade secret. The only protections
afforded a trade secret owner are those against acquisition by
improper means or breach of confidence. Trade secret law
does not prohibit either independent development or acquisi-
tion by proper means. 24 Trade secret law seeks to accomplish,
by maintaining commercial ethics, that which the copyright
and patent laws seek to accomplish by granting limited monop-
19. Id. at 481 (emphasis supplied).
20. Compare Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (patent and copyright) with Jostens, 318 N.W.2d
at 701 (trade secret).
21. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
22. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 480 (1974).
23. See id. at 481-82. Cf Cherne Indus. Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc. Inc., 278
N.W.2d 81, 94 (Minn. 1979). This latter proposition is illustrated by the fact that, at
least under the Restatement (First) of Torts view, trade secret protection will not be
extended to information that is not used even if it would otherwise qualify. The RE-
STATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS defines a trade secret as "any formula, pattern, device
or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 comment b (emphasis added). If the informa-
tion is not used, there can be no benefit to society. There is arguably no public policy
reason to protect the secrecy of such unused information, since benefit to the public
could only result from disclosure or use. But see Jet Spray, 377 Mass. 159, 385 N.E.2d
1349, 1358 n.13, where although the court found that the plaintiff had never made
any use of the information in question, it did not consider the issue of "use" as re-
quired by the Restatement's definition.
24. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 475-76. Since that which is in the public domain
cannot be removed by action of the States, id. at 48 1, it is wholly permissible to utilize
proper means to derive another's trade secret by analysis of that which the trade
secret owner makes available to the public, including products from which the trade
secret may be reverse engineered. Id. at 476. Reverse engineering means starting




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss3/6
19DE.I1- SEICRI7S
olies. Thus, without granting any monopoly, but in further-
ance of the same general objectives as those underlying the
monopolies afforded by the patent and copyright laws, the law
of trade secrets seeks to maintain a balance between a devel-
oper's interest in the exploitation of his own discovery, on the
one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of
ideas, information, and commerce on the other.2 5
Balanced against a developer's interest in the exploitation of
his discovery, for example, is the generally accepted principle
that "no restrictions should fetter an employee's right to apply
to his own best advantage the skills and knowledge acquired by
the overall experience of his previous employment."-2 3 This is
so even to the extent that such knowledge and skill include
"techniques which are . . . 'skillful variations of general
processes known to the particular trade.' "27 The "talent or
expertise" of employees also does not come within the scope
of trade secret protection. 28 An employee's experience and




Only knowledge gained at an employer's expense, which
takes on the characteristics of a trade secret, and which would
be unfair for the employee to use elsewhere, is deemed confi-
dential and is not to be disclosed or used."" Where the infor-
mation in question does not qualify as a trade secret, an
employer cannot prevent or limit a former employee's use of
such information, even by contract.3 ' If he attempts to do so
without a good faith basis for claiming that the information is a
trade secret, he may run afoul of the federal antitrust laws and
risk potential liability in a treble damage action .3 2 Even where
an employer does possess a trade secret, courts have generally
25. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
26. Jim W. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Minn. 1980)
(quoting Reed, Roberts Assoc., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307, 353 N.E.2d 590,
593, 386 N.Y.S.2d 677, 680 (1976)).
27. Id.
28. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 900 (Minn.
1983).
29. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 701-02.
30. Id. at 702.
31. Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Sciences Corp., 400 N.E.2d 1274, 1288
(Mass. App. Ct. 1980); Ailler, 298 N.W.2d at 459. But see Saliterman v. Finney, 361
N.W.2d 175, 177 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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recognized that the policies favoring free competition and em-
ployee mobility require that the employer's injunctive relief be
limited in scope so as to prevent a former employee's use of
only the trade secret."" Most courts have also recognized that
all forms of relief should relate only to the length of time it
would have taken to lawfully duplicate the trade secret by in-
dependent development or reverse engineering.34
It should be recognized, therefore, that there are several
public policy interests sought to be served, in balance, by the
law of trade secrets. Some of them are competing, and others
are closely interrelated. Each case should include considera-
tion and a careful balancing of all the pertinent policy interests
by thorough analysis of the particular facts and circumstances
of the case. This requires not only that the court understand
the technology and the particular industry well enough to ap-
preciate and properly decide the merits of the case, but also
that the legal framework be applied in such a way as to allow a
consideration of the pertinent policy issues. The remainder of
this Article will discuss the capacity of the courts to deal with
technical subject matter and the analytical framework under
which they should do so in trade secret cases.
II. ARE COURTS CAPABLE OF UNDERSTANDING TECHNOLOGY
WELL ENOUGH TO RESOLVE TECHNICAL TRADE
SECRET CLAIMS?
To the extent that proper disposition of trade secret cases
requires an understanding of technical subject matter or of a
particular industry, the court system is adequately equipped to
develop and digest the evidence necessary to achieve that end.
A sufficient comprehension of the technology can be provided
if the litigants will only take advantage of the wide variety of
available educational techniques.
Litigants have educated judges and juries using techniques
such as expert testimony, tours, and demonstrations. For ex-
ample, in Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Systems, Inc.,35 the
court was afforded tours of the parties' technical facilities,
33. See E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1113-16 (8th Cir.
1969); By-Beek Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 1958 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,144 (Cal. D.C. App. 1958).
34. See infra text accompanying notes 200-01.
35. 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982).
[Vol. 12
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demonstrations of the technology, and detailed explanations
by expert witnesses of what computer programs are, how they
are developed, and how they function. This was accompanied
by slides, video tape, and film presentations to depict the tech-
nology at work. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,36 though not a trade
secret case, involved technical subject matter. In SCM, Xerox
Corporation rented a warehouse near the courthouse, assem-
bled, in chronological order, virtually every Xerox copying
machine ever marketed, and then provided the court and jury
with a guided, educational tour of this museum of Xerox
history.
Judges and juries do find it difficult to properly apply the
principles of trade secret law when plaintiffs use a "black box"
approach37 to technical trade secret litigation. This will most
often occur at the pleading stage, since plaintiff's management
and counsel themselves may not understand the technology
sufficiently well to determine specifically what the plaintiff's
trade secret is,38 and it is particularly likely to occur in a case
where a defendant ex-employee was the only one intimately
familiar with the plaintiffs technical information and its devel-
opment. 39 By the time discovery has framed the issues for
trial, however, the plaintiff should be able to precisely define
the information which it claims as its trade secret. Failure to
do so should, and generally will, be perceived as an effort to
play upon a court's lack of technical sophistication and obfus-
cate the fact that the plaintiff has no trade secret. Courts have
36. 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016, rehearing denied,
456 U.S. 985.
37. That is, suggesting that somewhere within their products or processes are
unique technical elements which are far too complex for judges and juries to under-
stand, but which are of great value by virtue of their very complexity.
38. See Larson, Modem Operandi: In High-Tech Industr, New Firms Often Get Fast Trip
to Courtroom, Wall St.J., Aug. 14, 1984, at 1, col. 6. Former employees of electronic
companies who compete with their former employers have a greater than fifty per-
cent chance of being sued for allegedly stealing trade secrets. Id. at 14. "Santa Clara
(California, Silicon Valley) is probably the hotbed for this type of suit." Id. at 1. The
incredible cost of developing a new semiconductor technology motivates a former
employer to sue a new company of former employees for allegedly stealing trade
secrets. Id. "The law permits companies to sue start-ups (new companies of former
employees) even on the suspicion that trade secrets have been stolen." Id. In one
such suit, the president of the plaintiff company was asked in a deposition what trade
secrets were stolen. The plaintiff's president replied that he did not know what was
stolen since he did not know what the defendant company was doing. Id.
39. See, e.g., Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 694-97 (discussing plaintiff's former engi-
neer's involvement with plaintiff's computer system).
19861
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properly become increasingly hostile to claims involving
vaguely defined trade secrets. 40
There are numerous opinions by both state and federal
courts which reflect a sound appreciation of technical subject
matter and a sufficient understanding of the technology to ar-
rive at a proper decision on the merits. Cases involving
software and other computer-related technology are illustra-
tive. Courts have amply demonstrated their ability to under-
stand the technical subject matter by explaining such
components of data processing as the central processing
unit,4 1 a computer program, 42 a subroutine,43 an application
program,44 an operating system,45 levels of computer lan-
guages,46 and source and object code.
4 7
40. See, e.g., Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 897;Jostens. 318 N.W.2d at 704 (without
a proven trade secret, there can be no action for misappropriation); E. It' Bliss Co.,
408 F.2d at 1116 (discovery order requiring specificity of allegedly stolen trade
secrets).
41. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D.
Pa. 1982), rev'd in part, remanded in part, 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). "[A]II computers ... have a central processing unit
(CPU) which is the integrated circuit that executes programs. In lay terms, the CPU
does the work it is instructed to do. Those instructions are contained on computer
programs." Id.
42. Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 813-14. "A computer program is a set of serial instruc-
tions that directs the computer to perform certain tasks." Id.
43. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 702 n.8.
[A] program or set of instructions with a beginning and a defined end, which
can be invoked at its beginning and will always return [at] its end after per-
forming a given function between those two points is called a "routine" or
"sub-routine." An example is a "square root routine" which will calculate
the square root of a number when it is started and will produce the answer
when it returns at its end.
Id.
44. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1243.
Computer programs can be categorized by function as either application
programs or operating system programs. Application programs usually per-
form a specific task for the computer user, such as word processing, check-
book balancing, or playing a game. In contrast, operating system programs
generally manage the internal functions of the computer or facilitate use of
application programs.
Id.
45. Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 814. "The operating system is configured to satisfy the
requirements of the physical environment of the computer, especially the structure of
the CPU, and to provide easy compatibility with software written in the general mar-
ketplace and with peripherals made by other manufacturers." Id.
46. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1243.
There are three levels of computer language in which computer programs
may be written. High level language, such as the commonly used BASIC or
FORTRAN, uses English words and symbols, and is relatively easy to learn
and understand . . . . A somewhat lower level language is assembly lan-
guage, which consists of alphanumeric labels (e.g., "ADC" means "add with
[Vol. 12
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. The Minnesota Supreme Court demonstrated its ability to
deal with complex technical subject matter injostens, where the
plaintiff's trade secret claims focused primarily upon an appli-
cation program developed for it by an independent contractor
named Adage.48 Jostens asserted that it was entitled to claim
ownership of any trade secrets embodied within the applica-
tion program which were not generally known or readily ascer-
tainable.49  While recognizing that "unique principles,
engineering, logic and coherence in computer software may be
accorded trade secret status ' ' 50 and that "generally known
computer elements may gain trade secret protection from the
nature of their combination,"-5' the court denied Jostens' trade
secret claim as to the application program.
52
The evidence showed that Adage used a structured pro-
gramming practice, putting together small, self-contained rou-
tines and using them as building blocks for new application
packages,53 and that Adage followed the industry practice of
maintaining a library of previously-written software routines
for use in creating new programs. 54 Jostens' application
software package was assembled by Adage's modified use of
two application software systems which were written for prior
customers. 55 The trial court found that Jostens' system did not
represent a novel technological contribution which differed
materially from methods already well-known in the field.
56
Jostens specifically argued that one of its former employees
had misappropriated its trade secrets by consorting with Ad-
carry"). Statements in high level language, and apparently also statements
in assembly language, are referred to as written in "source code." The
third, or lowest level computer language, is machine language, a binary lan-
guage using two symbols, 0 and 1, to indicate an open or closed switch
... .Statements in machine language are referred to as written in "object
code."
Id.
47. Id. "The CPU can only follow instructions written in object code. However,
programs are usually written in source code which is more intelligible to humans.
Programs written in source code can be converted or transalated by a "compiler"
program into object code for use by the computer." Id.
48. 318 N.W.2d at 694-95.
49. Id. at 696-97.
50. Id. at 698.
51. Id. at 699.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 699-700.
54. Id. at 700.
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age to use routines from Jostens' application software in writ-
ing similar application software for National Computer
Systems. 57 The court applied established principles of trade
secret law to the new technology of structured computer pro-
gramming which it had learned from the evidence adduced at
trial and concluded that "[an employee's skills and experi-
ence], to the extent derived from generally known sources, are
not considered confidential; a computer programmer, like a
real estate sales person, should be able to ply his trade."-
58
The Minnesota Supreme Court is but one of many courts
which have demonstrated their ability to understand new tech-
nology and properly decide trade secret cases on their merits
when the parties provide the court with a sufficient factual ba-
sis upon which to do so. 5'9 What, then, is the framework of
trade secret law within which the courts should consider the
operative facts in order to maintain the proper balance of in-
terests and achieve proper results?
III. THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF TRADE SECRET LAW
The law of trade secrets had its origin in the common law.
The Restatement (First) of Torts,6 0 published in 1939, is the most
frequently-cited attempt to synthesize the common law of
trade secrets. 6 1 During the 1960's, a growing concern with the
lack of uniformity among jurisdictions, and a perceived lack of
consistency even within jurisdictions, led to a proposal for uni-
form statutory treatment of trade secret law. In 1979, the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved a codification of trade secret law entitled "The Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act" (Uniform Act). 6 2 In 1980, Minnesota
became the first state to adopt a statutory scheme based upon
the Uniform Act.63 Nine other states have since followed
57. Id. at 701.
58. Id. at 702.
59. See, e.g., cases cited, supra notes 10, 41-47.
60. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757.
61. The Restatement (Second) of Torts treats trade regulation as a body of law sepa-
rate from tort law and therefore eliminates all provisions regarding trade secrets.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, at 1 (1979).
62. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 537 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
UNIFORM ACT].
63. See Act of Apr. 23, 1980, ch. 594 §§ 3-12, 1980 Minn. Laws 1103 (codified at
MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08 (1984)).
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While there are significant differences between the common
law of trade secrets and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, courts
have used the same basic framework in applying both of them.
Most courts view trade secret cases as having basically three
components. First, does the plaintiff have a trade secret? Sec-
ond, has the trade secret been misappropriated? Finally, if the
first two elements are present, what is the proper remedy?
65
A. The First Question-Does a Trade Secret Exist?
The Restatement provides that "[a] trade secret may consist of
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one's business and which gives him an oppor-
tunity to gain an advantage over competitors who do not know
or use it."66 The Restatement asserts that "an exact definition of
a trade secret is not possible."-67 It suggests six factors for
courts to consider in determining whether particular informa-
tion constitutes a trade secret.68 While excluding from trade
secret protection information which does not meet the use re-
quirement or which would not qualify under the six-factor
test, 6 - the Restatement separately affords more limited protec-
64. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-3426.10 (West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 35-50 to 35-58 (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001-2009
(Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to 24-2-3-8 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 60-3320 to 60-3330 (1983); L.A. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431 to 51:1439
(West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to 30-14-409 (1985); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§47-25.1-01 to 47-25.1-08 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.108.010 to 19.108.940 (Supp. 1986).
65. See Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Serels Art, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 277-78 (1980).
66. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) oF ToNTs § 757 comment b.
67. Id.
68. Id. (1) The extent to which the information is known outside of his busi-
ness; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in
his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of
the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competi-
tors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the
information; and (6) the ease or difficulv with which the information could
be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
Id. at comment b.
69. Id.
[A trade secret] differs from other secret information in a business ... in
that it is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the con-
duct of the business, as, for example, the amount or other terms of a secret
bid for a contract or the salary of certain employees, or the security invest-
ments made or contemplated, or the date fixed For their announcement of a
new policy or for bringing out a new model or the like.
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tion to certain types of non-trade secret, confidential business
information.
70
In contrast to the Restatement, the Uniform Act is premised
upon the notion that a single definition of "trade secret" is
possible. In the interest of uniformity and predictability, the
Uniform Act defines trade secret as essentially any information
which:
(1) is not generally known to and not readily ascertainable
by proper means by other persons who can obtain eco-
nomic value from its disclosure or use;
(2) from this, derives independent economic value, actual
or potential; and
(3) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
7'
Thus, the types of information which can qualify as trade
secrets under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act are broader than
under the Restatement. Both the commentators 72 and those few
courts which have decided cases under the Uniform Act agree
that information of any type may constitute a trade secret
under the Uniform Act. 73 Under the Uniform Act, the analysis
of whether particular information is a trade secret is more spe-
cifically focused.7 4 The various factors which must be consid-
ered under the common law are pertinent under the Act only
70. The Restatement (First) of Torts provides that any information which was
(1) about one's business and (2) maintained as confidential is entitled to protection
against acquisition by improper means-i.e., theft, etc. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 759 comments b, c. However, absent a contractual obligation of confidence,
no action would lie for use or disclosure of non-trade secret, confidential information
by one to whom it was disclosed in confidence. See id.
71. UNIFORM ACT supra note 62, at 542. Minnesota Statutes section 325C.01,
subdivision 5 provides in pertinent part:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compila-
tion, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy.
MINN. STAT. § 325C.01, subd. 5 (1984).
72. See, e.g., Klitzke, supra note 65, at 284-89 (1980).
73. See, e.g., Totalizer Co. v. Automate Ltd., No. 7268, slip op. (Del. Ch., New
Castle Co., Aug. 12, 1983).
74. Compare United Wild Rice v. Nelson, 313 N.W.2d 628, 634 (Minn. 1982)
("the statutory definition mirrors that set out in Cierne") wit/i Electro-Craft. 332
N.W.2d at 898 ("To the extent . . . that the Act modifies the common law, we are
constrained to give effect to the statutory language").
[Vol. 12
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to the extent that they bear upon whether the three statutory
elements of a trade secret are present. 75 Moreover, the Uni-
form Act eliminates any requirement that the information be
"used" in one's business in order to qualify as a trade secret. 71
B. The Second Question-Has There Been a Misappropriation?
The Restatement and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act provide
similar standards for determining whether there has been a
misappropriation. Under the Restatement, the standard is
whether the trade secret has been acquired by improper means
such as theft, fraud or similar misconduct or has been dis-
closed or used in breach of a duty of confidentiality. 77 For pur-
poses of Restatement section 757, "[t]he question is simply
whether in the circumstances B knows or should know that the
information is A's trade secret and that its disclosure is made
in confidence."
7
Under the Restatement, one who innocently acquires an-
other's trade secret is not liable for any disclosure or use prior
to receiving notice that it is a trade secret status and that it was
acquired by mistake or through another's breach of confi-
dence. There is no liability for his disclosure or use even after
such notice if he has already paid value or materially changed
his position.
79
The Uniform Act provides a specific definition of"misappro-
75. See, e.g., Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 698 n.4 (the statutory definition does not re-
quire that the information was gained at the owner's expense). Even those Restate-
ment factors which are not expressly embodied in the Uniform Act may warrant
consideration, however, if they are of probative value with respect to the statutory
elements -e.g., economic value. See Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 901 n. 12 (under the
Act, whether the information was gained at the owner's expense becomes a possible
element of proof that the information provides a competitive advantage).
76. See UNIFORM ACT supra note 62, § 1; see also Klitzke, supra note 65, at 288.
77. Section 757 of the Restatement provides:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to
do so, is liable to the other if (a) he discovered the secret by improper
means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence re-
posed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him, or (c) he learned
the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it was a secret and
that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the third per-
son's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that
its disclosure was made to him by mistake.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757.
78. Id. § 757 commcntj.
79. Id. § 758.
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priation."' 0 The definition applies to the acquisition of a trade
secret of another if the acquirer knows or has reason to know
that the trade secret was acquired by improper means."' In all
other circumstances, misappropriation applies to disclosure or
use of the trade secret. 82 There are three sets of circumstances
under which disclosure or use of a trade secret may constitute
misappropriation under the Uniform Act: (1) where knowl-
edge of the trade secret was derived by improper means or
through a person who utilized improper means to obtain the
information; (2) where the information was acquired under
circumstances giving rise to a duty of confidentiality or
through another who acquired it under such circumstances;
and (3) where the information was acquired through accident
or mistake.
8 3
Under the Uniform Act, disclosure or use without knowl-
edge of, or reason to know of, the circumstances which render
disclosure or use wrongful does not constitute misappropria-
tion.8 4 The Uniform Act thus continues the immunity which
the Restatement afforded for disclosure or use of a trade secret
prior to the time that the party had notice that it was the trade
secret of another and had not been properly acquired. Unlike
the Restatement, though, the Uniform Act does not recognize
continuing immunity after notice in all situations where a party
has paid value or materially changed his position before receiv-
ing such notice. Under the Uniform Act, continuing immunity
exists only where knowledge of the trade secret was acquired
by accident or mistake-not where it was acquired through a
third party who either obtained it improperly or breached a
duty of confidentiality.8 5
C. The Third Question-What is the Appropriate Remedy?
The Restatement provides little guidance as to the remedy to
be granted for the misappropriation of a trade secret. Under
the common law, courts are free to fashion whatever remedy is
appropriate. This can include injunctive relief, an award of
damages suffered by the trade secret owner, disgorgement of
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unjust enrichment by the misappropriator, punitive damages,
or a combination of the foregoing.8" The Uniform Act ex-
pressly provides for all of these remedies, 87 as well as awards
of attorney's fees to the prevailing party under appropriate cir-
cumstances. s8 In contrast to the Restatement, the Uniform Act
and the comments thereto provide substantial guidance as to
the framing of appropriate remedies. 89
IV. PROBLEMS IN APPLYING TRADE SECRET LAW
The legal framework developed under the common law and
perpetuated under the Uniform Act has led courts to sepa-
rately consider the trade secret and the misappropriation as-
pects of trade secret claims. For example, in Eutectic Welding
Alloys Corp. v. West,10 the Minnesota Supreme Court described
the elements of an action for appropriation of a trade secret as
being "that such trade secrets in fact existed; that such trade
secrets had been acquired by the defendagt as a result of a con-
fidential relationship; and that defendant had used and dis-
closed such secrets.'' l Thus, courts have come to view the
liability analysis of trade secret misappropriation claims as in-
volving two distinct elements. The first element is whether the
plaintiff has demonstrated a property interest in the informa-
tion in question-i.e., whether a trade secret exists. The sec-
ond element is whether there has been a misappropriation-
i.e., was there a breach of a confidential relationship?'2
Some courts have explained their decisions exclusively in
terms of either a property analysis or a confidential relation-
ship analysis. The more analytical courts, however, have ex-
pressed discomfort with separate treatment of the property
and misappropriation elements. As emphasized by the court in
Jostens, the various elements "should not be artificially sepa-
86. See, e.g., Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 85. l'laintiff was awarded a permanent injunc-
tion restraining defendants from rendering services for a period of two years to
plaintiff's former or prospective customcrs: $39,322 in compensatory damages ; and
$10,000 in punitive damages. Id.
87. UNIFORM ACT, s.tpr7a note 62. § 2-3, at 544-48.
88. Id. §§ 3-4, at 546-48.
89. Id. § 2-4 (injunctive reliel, damages and attorney's fees). See infa text accom-
panying notes 190, 197-98, 200-01.
90. 281 Minn. 13, 160 N.W.2d 566 (1968).
91. Id. at 18, 160 N.W.2d at 570.
92. See Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 892: Jostens. 318 N.W.2d at 701: Eutectic
Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 160 N.W.2d at 570.
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rated for purposes of analysis since, in a significant sense, they
are interdependent.' '9 Unfortunately, constrained by the
traditional framework of trade secret law, even the more ana-
lytical courts have tended to separately address and explain the
property and misappropriation issues.
One example of a court emphasizing the property element is
Cherne Industrial, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, Inc.9 4 In Cherne, the
court found that the defendants breached contractual and
common law duties not to use or disclose the plaintiff's confi-
dential and trade secret information. The court explained:
The protection to which plaintiff was entitled is similar to
that provided to the holder of a copyright. Both are pro-
tected from the unauthorized use of their ideas, ideas that,
in many cases, they have spent significant time, skill, and
money in developing. 95
More recently, inJostens, the same court emphasized the misap-
propriation element. Finding that the defendants had
breached no duty to the plaintiff, the court stated:
The protection afforded trade secrets is not intended to re-
ward or promote the development of secret processes
(although it does, of course, benefit the enterprising devel-
oper), but rather is to protect against breaches of faith and
the use of improper methods to obtain information. Trade
secret law seeks to maintain standards of loyalty and trust in
the business community.96
In reviewing these decisions, at least one commentator ar-
gues that the property and misappropriation elements are ana-
lytically discrete and suggests that the interdependence
referred to in the Jostens opinion means nothing more than a
limited overlapping of evidence.9J7 The problem with this ap-
proach is that the discrete treatment of these elements and of
their underlying policies is precisely what has led to ostensibly
inconsistent declarations by courts and confusion as to what
the law is.
For example, in both Cherne' 8 and Electro-Craft Corp. v. Con-
93. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 701 (quoting 2 R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE
SECRETS § 7.07(1), at 136); see Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 903.
94. 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979).
95. Id. at 94.
96. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 701 (citation omitted).
97. See Note, supra note I1, at 988 n.19.
98. Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 94.
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trolled Motion, Inc., 99 the court's analysis focused primarily upon
the trade secret or "property" element. In so doing, the deci-
sions suggest dramatically different requirements for obtaining
trade secret protection. In Cherne, the court found that certain
information should be accorded trade secret status, stating
that "[t]here would be little purpose in taking such a quantity
of documents if defendants did not believe the information
was valuable."' 00 The court was not impressed by the defend-
ants' proof that there were alternative means by which they
could have properly obtained the same information from other
sources.' 0' This analysis suggests that even a relatively weak
showing of property rights would entitle an employer to trade
secret protection.
In Electro-Craft, applying the more liberal standards of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the court reached the opposite
conclusion. In Electro-Craft, there was evidence supporting the
trial court's finding that the defendants knew or should have
known of the employer's intention to treat the subject informa-
tion as confidential. The information at issue was of a type
which other courts had found to satisfy the trade secret or
property element. 0 2 The court concluded that no trade secret
existed, however, because of what the court termed the
"nonintuitive nature" of the claimed trade secrets, and be-
cause the employer failed to let the employees know "in no
uncertain terms" specifically what information it intended to
keep confidential.103 In contrast to Cherne, the Electro-Craft
analysis suggests that a very strong showing of property rights
is necessary before an employer will be found entitled to trade
secret protection.
This problem has been even further compounded in cases
99. 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983).
100. Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 90.
101. Id. at 90-91. But see Hiller; 298 N.W.2d at 459 (because the knowledge ac-
quired by defendant during the course of his employment by plaintiff was generally
available to the public from a variety of sources, defendant's possession of this knovl-
edge cannot support a restraint on his competing with plaintiff); Van Products Co. v.
General Welding & Fabrication Co., 419 Pa. 248, 261-62, 213 A.2d 769, 776-77
(1965).
102. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 899-903.
103. Id. at 902-03. In 1985 the Minnesota legislature reacted to the Electro-Craft
decision by amending Minnesota's version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to make
it clear that failure to give specific notice will not defeat a trade secret claim if, under
all the circumstances, the person to whom the information is disclosed reasonably
ought to know of the intent to treat it as such. See MINN. STAT. § 325C.01, subd. 5.
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where the courts have been called upon to decide whether the
information in question, albeit confidential, qualified for pro-
tection as a trade secret. As previously noted, the Restatement
suggests that certain types of information, although sensitive
and sought to be kept confidential, should not be treated as
trade secrets. 0 4 While the Restatement provides a cause of ac-
tion in tort in the event of improper procurement of non-trade se-
cret, confidential information about another's business for
competitive purposes, this is treated as a separate issue involv-
ing different policy considerations.10 5
This distinction between the levels of protection afforded to
different types of confidential business information under the
Restatement is curious, since the stated policy underlying the
tort of trade secret misappropriation is to maintain standards
of business ethics and not to promote the development of any
particular type of information.106 The distinction between
"trade secret" and "confidential" information clearly goes to
the nature of the information to be protected, rather than to
the type of conduct to be condemned. The fact remains, how-
ever, that under the Restatement there is no action in tort for the
unauthorized disclosure or use of non-trade secret, confiden-
tial information obtained in confidence. This distinction has
proven troublesome for the courts and has resulted in some
decisions which, when examined in light of the public policy
interests sought to be served, are at least confusing if not
downright conflicting.
In Cherne, the issue was "whether the defendants used confi-
dential information or trade secrets belonging to the plaintiff
.... ,,7Noting that the defendants' employment agree-
ments with the plaintiff defined "confidential information" as
"information not generally known, about [the plaintiffs]
processes or products," and adopting the generally accepted
Restatement definition of "trade secret," the court fashioned a
four-part test applicable to both confidential information and
trade secrets. The elements of that test are: "(1) the protected
matter is not generally known or readily ascertainable, (2) it
provides a demonstrable competitive advantage, (3) it was
gained at expense to the employer, and (4) it is such that the
104. See supra note 69.
105. See RESTATEMENT (FIRTS) OF ToRTs § 759.
106. See id. § 757, comment 1).
107. Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 89.
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employer intended to keep it confidential." 108
It appeared from Cherne, therefore, that the only confidential
information subject to protection against unauthorized disclo-
sure or use, even under a written nondisclosure agreement,
was information that would qualify as a trade secret under the
four-part test. Finding that the information in question did
qualify as a trade secret under that test, the court awarded re-
lief to the plaintiff, noting that:
[t]he purpose of the [restrictive employment] contract was
to protect plaintiffs legitimate business interest in the infor-
mation it had developed . . . . Defendants had both con-
tractual and common law duties not to disclose this
information and not to use it to harm plaintiffs business. ° 1
In Jim W. Miller Construction, Inc. v. Schaefer, I 10 where the na-
ture of the information in question was such that it could not
qualify for trade secret protection, the plaintiff tried a different
tack. Rather than relying upon a nondisclosure agreement or
asserting a trade secret claim, the plaintiff sought to indirectly
prohibit the competitive use or disclosure of its nonconfiden-
tial information by use of a noncompete agreement."' Recog-
nizing that, as a matter of policy, no restrictions should fetter
an employee's right to apply to his own advantage the skills
and knowledge acquired by the overall experience of his previ-
ous employment, the court held that "the fact that an em-
ployee has during the course of his employment acquired
nonconfidential information and skills that are not secret
processes cannot support the enforcement of a restrictive cove-
nant. '" 12 The court found the restrictive covenant unreasona-
ble and unenforceable "because the restraint it imposed does
not in any legitimate manner protect plaintiffs business or
good will."''113
Cherne suggests that information which would not qualify as a
108. Id. at 90.
109. Id. at 94.
110. 298 N.W.2d 455 (Minn. 1980).
111. For a discussion of the impact of employment agreements on trade secret
litigation, see Garry, The Relationship Between Employment Agreements and Trade Secret
Litigation in Minesota: The Evolution of Trade Secret Law fiom Cherne to Electro-Craft, 11
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 501 (1985).
112. Miller, 298 N.W.2d at 459 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 458; cf. Entectic W1'elding, 160 N.W.2d at 566 (merely labeling information
confidential does not make it so or support either a claim for trade secret misap-
propration or the enforcement of a noncompete agreement).
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trade secret could not be the subject of a contractual restric-
tion upon disclosure or use. Miller suggests that the disclosure
of information which would not qualify as a trade secret could
not, by itself, support a covenant not to compete. Indeed, as
recently as 1982, the Minnesota Supreme Court seemed to re-
affirm that only "knowledge gained at an employer's expense,
which takes on the characteristics of a trade secret and which
would be unfair for the employee to use elsewhere, is deemed
confidential and is not to be disclosed or used."
' "14
Through this line of cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court
adhered fairly well to the Restatement view that only information
qualifying as a trade secret ought to be protected against unau-
thorized disclosure or use. The Court thereby preserved the
right of an employee to exploit his own general knowledge and
skill, including non-trade secret information gained in his prior
employment. By establishing a fairly liberal standard for prov-
ing the existence of a trade secret, and simultaneously limiting
the types of information in which an employer could claim a
legitimate business interest, the court had risen to the chal-
lenge of maintaining a proper balance between the competing
policies of encouraging development of new ideas and promot-
ing the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce.
Under this line of cases, the only restrictions on disclosure
or use of confidential information deemed reasonable to pro-
tect the legitimate business interests of an employer, whether
by a nondisclosure or noncompete contract or at common law,
is the restriction against unauthorized disclosure or use of in-
formation which qualifies as a trade secret.
In other cases, however, the court clouded its message. In
United Wild Rice, Inc. v. Nelson, 115 the plaintiff asserted that the
defendant had appropriated its trade secrets or confidential in-
formation and used them to the plaintiff's detriment. Applying
the four-part Cherne test "for determining which information is
confidential or a trade secret," '" 16 the court found that the in-
formation in question did not qualify as a trade secret and re-
jected the plaintiff's misappropriation claim." 7 Up to this
point, the court was apparently adhering to the view that an
114. SeeJostens, 318 N.W.2d at 702 (emphasis supplied).
115. 313 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. 1982).
116. Id. at 633-34.
117. Id. at 634.
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employer cannot restrict a former employee's disclosure or use
of information which does not qualify as a trade secret, even if
otherwise deemed confidential. The court went on to say,
however, that "[t]his 'confidential information' would properly
be the subject of a covenant not to compete, not a charge of
unfair competition. This is especially true in situations such as
the instant case where the market is small and one concern
holds a large portion of that market.""1
8
While appearing faithful to the proposition that only infor-
mation which qualified as a trade secret could support a claim
of misappropriation, the United Wild Rice court seemingly con-
tradicted its holding in Miller by suggesting that an employee's
acquisition of sensitive business information might be suffi-
cient to support the enforcement of a restrictive covenant,
even though the information does not qualify as a trade secret.
The only potentially distinguishing feature between the two
cases is the court's comment in United Wild Rice that the market
was small and that the plaintiff held a large portion of that mar-
ket. Perhaps the court would have concluded that, under these
circumstances, a covenant not to compete for the purpose of
protecting plaintiff's "goodwill" would have been reasonable
and enforceable because the restraint imposed would have
served to protect plaintiff's legitimate business interests with-
out imposing upon the employee any greater restraint than is
reasonably necessary for that purpose.' 19
More recently, in Saliterman v. Finney, 120 the Minnesota Court
of Appeals held that "confidential" information need not qual-
ify as trade secret to be protectable under either contract or
common law.' 2 ' Citing both Cherne andJostens for the proposi-
tion that relief may be granted against a party who wrongfully
used confidential information or trade secrets obtained from
his employer in violation of an explicit agreement or a com-
mon law duty, 22 the court affirmed the trial court's conclusion
that the defendant had "breached his common law duty not to
disclose or use confidential information gained at the expense
of his employer." 23
118. Id.
119. See Miller, 298 N.W.2d at 458.
120. 361 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
121. Id. at 178.
122. Id. at 178-79.
123. Id. at 179.
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The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, as enacted in Minnesota in
1980 124 and applied in Saliterman, includes a definition of trade
secret which expressly displaced conflicting tort law pertaining
to misappropriation of trade secrets.' 2 5 By its terms, however,
the Act does not affect "contractual or other civil liability or
relief that is not based upon misappropriation of a trade se-
cret." ' 2" For reasons that are not clear from the opinion, the
Saliterman court apparently determined that the information in
question would not qualify as a trade secret, even under the
broad definition contained in the Uniform Act. That, however,
did not stop the court from applying the common law and
granting relief.
Citing Electro-Craft for the proposition that "The Uniform
Trade Secrets Act is not a 'catch-all' for all industrial torts,"' 12 7
the Saliterman court read Cherne and Jostens as having estab-
lished two separate common law torts for misappropriation of
sensitive business information - trade secret misappropria-
tion, and misappropriation of confidential information - both
of which employ precisely the same common law test. 128 Thus,
while the common law standard no longer applies to trade se-
cret claims in Minnesota, having been displaced by the broader
protection afforded by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, it ap-
pears that the common law standard may still be applied in
misappropration cases if the information is denominated "con-
fidential" rather than "trade secret" information. The Sal-
iterman holding defies reason, particularly since the
"confidential" information in question is of a type which may
qualify for trade secret protection under the Uniform Act, but
is expressly excluded from trade secret protection under the
Restatement, 129 the source of the rule expressed in the cases
upon which the Saliterman court relied for its reasoning.
The courts have given equally contradictory signals with re-
gard to the "breach of business ethics" or "misappropriation"
element. In Electro-Craft, the court held that "[w]ithout a
proven trade secret there can be no action for misappropria-
124. MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08.
125. Id. § 325C.01, subd. 5.
126. Id. § 325C.07(b)(1).
127. Saliterman, 361 N.W.2d at 178.
128. See id. at 178-79.
129. See supra notes 66, 69.
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tion, even if defendants' actions were wrongful."'' 31 In Sal-
iterman, decided a year later, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
cited both Cherne and Jostens as authority for holding that an
employer may have a claim for breach of an employee's com-
mon law duty of confidence, even though the information in
question does not qualify as a trade secret.
13
The property/misappropriation dichotomy has also resulted
in inconsistency with respect to the remedies afforded in trade
secret cases. This is perhaps best illustrated by the case of Jet
Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton.' -3 2 In Jet Spray, the plaintiffs for-
mer employees utilized, in competition with the plaintiff, cer-
tain information in the form of recommendations contained in
a report that the plaintiff had commissioned from an independ-
ent consultant. 3 3 The report had taken approximately three
months to prepare, and the recommendations, which had
never been used by the plaintiff, were of only minor benefit to
the defendants in developing their competing product.' 34 A
damage master, focusing upon protecting the plaintiffs prop-
erty interests, determined that the plaintiff was only entitled to
the defendants' profits for three months, the amount of time it
would have taken to independently develop the information in
issue. 135 The court, stressing the defendants' breach of confi-
dence, ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to an accounting for
all of the defendants' profits for the entire twelve years they
had been in business.
13 6
The cases cited above serve to demonstrate how courts view-
ing trade secret cases from a property or misappropriation per-
spective might focus inordinately upon one of the pertinent
policy considerations, while disregarding others. Perceived in-
consistencies in the standards applied by the courts are of seri-
ous concern to entrepreneurs who have undertaken or are
about to undertake the cost and risk of high technology re-
search and development, and are of equal concern to their em-
130. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 897.
131. Saliterman, 361 N.W.2d at 178-79.
132. 377 Mass. 159, 385 N.E.2d 1349 (1979).
133. Id. at 163-64, 385 N.E.2d at 1353.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 164, 385 N.E. 2d at 1353.
136. Id. at 169, 385 N.E.2d at 1356; see also Aries, 366 N.W.2d at 366. There, citing
the broad range of remedies authorized by the Uniform Act, the court affirmed an
award including injunctive relief and plaintiffs actual damages and defendant's reve-
nues and a royalty and punitive damages and attorney's fees. Id. at 369.
1 9861]
25
Davidson and DeMay: Application of Trade ecret Law to New Technology—Unwinding the T
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986
1IILLL11 .UIIT(ItEI. L41I' REUIEII'
ployees. Can trade secret law serve as a flexible and yet
reasonably uniform and predictable means of protecting legiti-
mate interests in new technology?
V. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING TRADE SECRET LAW
Trade secret law can serve as a flexible and yet reasonably
uniform and predictable means of protecting legitimate inter-
ests in new technology, provided that courts recognize and
maintain a careful balance of the policies underlying the law of
trade secrets. As the foregoing discussion illustrates, courts
can lose sight of this balance if they give separate treatment to
the "property" and "business ethics" aspects of trade secret
cases. Whether information should be protected in a given
case should depend upon the total circumstances surrounding
both the plaintiff's claimed property interest and the defend-
ant's alleged violation of business ethics.
A slight showing of property rights in information may be
sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to protection if the circum-
stances demonstrate a relatively egregious breach of business
ethics. Arguably, the Cherne court meant to suggest this by de-
claring that, even if the same information could have been ob-
tained from other readily available sources, an employee may
still be liable for misappropriation if he, in fact, used his em-
ployer's confidential information. 3 7 Similarly, unless the law
of trade secrets is to be grossly distorted, this is also the only
meaning to be attributed to the language in Saliterman which
suggests that an employee is under a common law duty not to
use the confidential information of his employer even though
the information in question does not qualify as a trade
secret. 138
Conversely, even a relatively strong showing of property
rights in information might not entitle the plaintiff to protec-
tion if the circumstances demonstrate little or no impact on
business ethics. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of Van
Products Co. v. General Welding and Fabricating Co. 139 involved
such a set of circumstances. The information at issue in that
case involved know-how developed over years of experimenta-
137. See Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 91.
138. See Salilerman, 361 N.W.2d at 178.
139. 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965).
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tion and adaptation at the plaintiff company. 40 The individual
defendant had no experience in the field prior to his employ-
ment with the plaintiff.14 During his employment he became
intimately familiar with the plaintiff's know-how and learned
virtually everything there was to know about the manufacture
and marketing of the plaintiff's product. 42 On the other hand,
the defendant (who was terminated by the plaintiff) had been,
to a large extent, the source of many aspects of the know-how
in question. 43 Moreover, when he developed a competing
product for his new employer, the product was similar to, but
not a copy of, that of the plaintiff. The similarities lay primarily
in the function of and general concept behind the technol-
ogy. 14 4 The court held that, under these circumstances, the
defendant had not misappropriated any trade secret of his ex-
employer. 14
5
In order to maintain sight of the interplay between the poli-
cies underlying the "property" concept and those favoring
protection of business ethics, the framework for analysis
should not consist of a wholly separate consideration of trade
secret issues and misappropriation issues. The questions
which should form the framework for analysis are:
(A) Does the plaintiff have any right to protection of the
information in question?
(B) Does the plaintiff have a right to protection against the
use or disclosure made or threatened by this particular
defendant?
(C) If so, what is the extent and, conversely, the limit of
that protection?
The following subsections will examine each of the above
factors.
A. Does The Plaintiff Have a Right to Trade Secret Protection?
Courts and commentators have stressed that the first ques-
tion in any trade secret case is whether a trade secret exists.146
140. See id. at 255-57, 213 A.2d at 773-74.
141. Id. at 252, 213 A.2d at 771.
142. Id. at 252, 213 A.2d at 772.
143. Id. at 261-62, 213 A.2d at 776-77.
144. Id. at 268-69, 213 A.2d at 780.
145. Id. at 269, 213 A.2d at 780.
146. 2 L. ALTMAN, CALLMANN UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPO-
LIES, § 14.02 (4th ed. 1982); see also Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 897; Wheelabrator
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This is usually viewed as a question of whether the information
qualifies as a form of intellectual property. 47 An analysis
which requires an initial determination of whether there is any
"property" in an alleged trade secret is appropriate, but only if
this initial determination is no more than a threshold test.
This initial trade secret test should not be unduly difficult to
meet. Nor should it be the only portion of the analysis where
factors that bear upon the plaintiff's property interests are
considered.
The issue at this stage is not whether the plaintiff's property
interests are strong enough to entitle him to protection in all
instances, or even whether those interests are strong enough
to warrant protection against this defendant. It does not in-
volve the balancing of interests which must occur later in the
analysis. This first step is merely a minimum threshold test-
i.e., whether the information in question could meet the mini-
mum requirements to qualify for protection under any circum-
stances. Properly applied, the definition of trade secret
contained in the Uniform Act can serve as just this type of min-
imum threshold test.' 48 Perhaps due to the common law back-
ground and the structure of the Act, however, the Minnesota
Supreme Court, a leader in interpreting the Act, has arguably
failed to treat it as such. 14
9
The resolution of this threshold trade secret test should de-
pend first upon whether the information has been maintained
as a secret by the plaintiff. If the information has been avail-
able to others who could obtain economic benefit from its dis-
closure or use, there is no justification for protection even
against one to whom the information may have been disclosed
in confidence. However, the policies underlying trade secret
law do not require absolute secrecy. All that is necessary is
relative secrecy. The information in question must be subject
to efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to main-
tain secrecy against other persons who might use or disclose it.
This is recognized both under the common law' °5 0 and in the
Corp. v. Fogle, 317 F. Supp. 633, 636 (W.D. La. 1970), ajf'd, 438 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir.
1971).
147. Wheelabrator, 317 F. Supp. at 637.
148. Uniform Act, supra note 62, § 1, at 541.
149. See Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 898.
150. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 comment b;jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 700;
Radium Remedies Co. v. Weiss, 173 Minn. 342, 347, 217 N.W. 339, 341 (1928).
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The Electro-Craft holding that employers who do not specifi-
cally notify employees of the particular information which is a
trade secret ipsofacto fail to maintain the secrecy necessary for
trade secret protection is not justifiable. This aspect of the
Electro-Craft opinion has been soundly criticized152 and has
been overruled, in effect, by legislative action in Minnesota. In
1985, the Minnesota Legislature amended the statutory defini-
tion of "trade secret" contained the Minnesota version of the
Uniform Act to make it clear that specific notice to employees
is not required.15 3 An employer's efforts to maintain secrecy as
against employees are sufficient if, under all the circumstances,
the employees know or should know that information of the
type in question is to be treated as confidential.1
54
Under the threshold trade secret test, the principal issue
should be whether the policies which would justify treating the
information akin to intellectual property are implicated at all.
If the information is a form of technical know-how, the ques-
tion should be whether that information represents a more
than trivial advancement of the art. If it does, the policy of
promoting such advances justifies at least some level of protec-
tion. If it does not, even the policy of protecting business eth-
ics fails to justify restraining the defendant's ability to compete
or the social cost of litigation. Under such circumstances, even
though the defendant's conduct in acquiring the information
may be reprehensible, he gains no unjust enrichment, and the
plaintiff suffers no measurable injury.155
In order to meet the threshold test, technical information or
know-how must not be readily ascertainable by proper means,
and, if appropriated and applied by others, it must lead to effi-
ciencies which are at least sufficiently great to outweigh the
cost of putting such an advance to commercial use. This has
been frequently expressed as a requirement that the informa-
151. Uniform Act, supra note 62, § 5, at 542 & comment 5.
152. See Note, supra note 11, at 1001-04.
153. Act of May 23, 1985, ch. 196. § 1, 1985 Minn. Laws 612 (codified as amended
at MINN. STAT. § 325C.01, subd. 5 (Stpp. 1985)).
154. Id.; see Aies, 366 N.W.2d at 369.
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tion at least amount to a discovery.t51 Injostens, the Minnesota
Supreme Court describes this requirement by reference to a
continuum:
Courts agree that trade secrets lie somewhere on a contin-
uum from what is generally known in a field to what has
some degree of uniqueness, although there need not be the
degree of novelty or originality required for patent or copy-
right protection . . . . Some measure of discovery is
required. ' 5
7
The Uniform Act expresses this requirement in terms of infor-
mation which derives independent economic value from not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.
Information of a type which the Restatement classifies as (non-
trade secret) confidential business information---e.g., secret bid
information, salary levels, etc.-does not advance an art. It is
protected primarily to preserve business ethics and, to a lesser
extent, to indirectly promote competitive achievement. By
preventing the use of competitors' confidential information
about such things as salaries and customers, society tends to
encourage fair competition by means which encourage the de-
velopment of more efficient methods of production, higher
quality, and lower pricing.
The threshold trade secret test with respect to such confi-
dential business information should be simply whether a com-
petitor could make at least some significant use of the
information to change the competitive balance between him-
self and the plaintiff. The Uniform Act has been structured to
provide a unified definition of "trade secret" applicable to
both technical know-how and confidential business informa-
tion. This test can serve reasonably well if it is treated as no
more than a threshold or "minimum property" test. 5 8
156. Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 366 F. Supp.
1173, 1184 (D. Ariz. 1973) qao/iug Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F.
Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aft'd, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
869 (1961); Koehring Co. v. E.). Etnyre & Co., 254 F. Supp. 334, 361 (N.D. Ill.
1966). Cf Pressure Science Inc. v. Kramer, 413 F. Supp. 618 (D. Conn. 1976), afrd
mew., 551 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976);Jostens. 318 N.W.2d at 698.
157. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 698.
158. Klitzke, supra note 65, at 287-88 (1980). In order to accomplish this end, the
requirement that the owner use the information has been eliminated. Id. Elimination
of this requirement makes sense in connection with business information and also in
connection with technical know-how where there is a justifiable reason [or the
owner's failure to use the information. Uniform Act. supra note 62, § I counent, at
[Vol. 12
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B. Does the Plaintiff Have a Right to Trade Secret Protection as
Against the Defendant?
Even if a trade secret is found to exist, an owner's entitle-
ment to protection against any particular disclosure or use
should not depend solely upon whether the defendant ac-
quired the information during the course of a confidential rela-
tionship. Each of the pertinent policies underlying the law of
trade secrets must be considered, and the competing interests
of the plaintiff, the defendant, and society itself must be con-
sidered and balanced.
The common law is certainly flexible enough to permit this
type of straight-forward balance of interests. While this ap-
proach might appear at first blush to be inconsistent with the
language of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the apparent in-
consistency disappears if the definition of "misappropriation"
under the Uniform Act is read expansively. At least where the
trade secret has not been acquired improperly, there will be a
"misappropriation" under the Uniform Act only if the defend-
ant knows or has reason to know that his knowledge of the
trade secret was acquired under circumstances giving rise to a
duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use. The "circum-
stances" to be considered must be more than the means by
which the trade secret was acquired. Otherwise, an ex-em-
ployee could be prevented from utilizing his skill and expertise
about a manufacturing process merely because they were de-
veloped while working for an employer-plaintiff. If the "cir-
cumstances" to be considered under the Act are all relevant
cimcumstances, a balance of interests is fully appropriate.
One purpose of the law of trade secrets is to maintain busi-
ness ethics. Consideration, therefore, must be given to the
manner in which the defendant acquired the information. Be-
cause another purpose of trade secret law is to ensure that en-
trepreneurs will incur the costs and risks associated with
research and development, consideration must also be given to
the developmental costs the plaintiff incurred and the risk of
failure the plaintiff assumed. Only by considering both of
541. Arguably, however, this is not true where an owner simply shelves newly discov-
ered information until he is forced to utilize it. Under these circumstances. the justi-
fications for society treating tie inforlation as intellectual property are absent.
Arguably no protection should be given. Alternativcly, if some level of protection is
given, the owner's failure to use his trade secret at the earliest opportunity should
limit the scope of the relief to which he is entitled. See snpra note 23.
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these factors can the level of need for trade secret protection
be assessed in any given case.
Of course, trade secret protection must not be so extensive
as to unnecessarily infringe upon society's interest in the free
flow of ideas, information, and commerce, including the dis-
semination of new technology. In addition, the manner in
which trade secret protection will restrict the defendant's abil-
ity to carry on his chosen trade or business must be balanced
against the considerations which support protection. The in-
terrelationship of these considerations is illustrated by the fol-
lowing matrices:
TRADE SECRET BALANCE OF INTERESTS MATRICES
A. Property and Business Ethics Considerations
MINIMAL
SUBSTANTIAL MODERATE INVESTMENT/RISK
INVESTMENT/ INVESTMENT/ BY PLAINTIFF OR
RISK BY RISK BY JUST "BUSINESS
PLAINTIFF PLAINTIFF INFORMATION"
DEFENDANT TOOK
.. ... .. . .-.-... .. .. .-.-. . . ..-. .. . -.-... ..
P L A IN T IF F ... :::.....::.: ...::: .:::.: .. .........
DISCLOSED
IN CO N FID ENCE ...............................
:::::::::::::::: :: :: :::  ..  .. .. .. : :: ::. ." : V b'; , . ................'' ' ..
1)E V I.O P 1) :~i~iiiiiiii~ :!ii....... :: .... ::::::: .... ::: ..................~~i {




PLA IN T IFF ........ :.. ::...... ....
] - Plaintiff should ordinarily prevail.
1 - )efindant should ordinarily 
prevail.
- ()tIConle conuld an depending upon the strength of the factors weighing
against protection (see tolo%%ing matrix).
[Vol. 12
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B. Balancing of Competing Interests in the Most Difficult Cases
MODERATE INVESTMENT/ LOW INVESTMENT/RISK
RISK AND DISCLOSED AND DISCLOSED
TO DEFENDANT TO DEFENDANT
OR OR
HIGH INVESTMENT/RISK MODERATE INVESTMENT/




AND/OR DEFENDANT CANENGAGE IN HIS TRADE
OR BUSINESS
WITHOUT USING




CANNOT REASONABLY . ...
ENGAGE IN HIS ........
TRADE OR BUSINESS . .. ..
WITHOUT USING
D - Plaintiff should ordinarily prevail.
- Defendant should ordinarily prevail.
- Plaintiff should prevail if, but only it" he can demonstrate that there was an understanding of
confidentiality (written or oral) between the plaintiff and the defendant when the defendant
acquired the information.
While these matrices are admittedly simplistic and incom-
plete, 151) they do serve to illustrate the interplay of the more
important factors which should determine whether trade secret
protection will be granted in any given case. They also aid in
explaining many of the apparently inconsistent statements and
rulings in trade secret cases. These apparent inconsistent rul-
ings usually occur because circumstances create a different bal-
ance of interests (i.e., the cases are far apart on the
matrices)." t o Courts should not be criticized for weighing and
balancing these competing interests to achieve equity in the
159. A "complete" matrix framework for application of trade secret law would
need to be drawn in multiple additional dimensions. Graphic illustration of the au-
thors' proposed framework is unnecessary, however, since courts are able to achieve
the same result bv abstract analysis.
160. With the exception of the Electro-Craft case, the authors believe that placing
the circumstances of the cases decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court and the
Minnesota Court of Appeals on the matrices demonstrates that, while the opinions
sometimes state apparently contradictory principles, they reach a correct result on
the liability issue. See supra text accompanying notes 90-136. Even the Electro-Craft
resut might have been justified if the defendants had themselves contributed to the
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individual cases.'"' The criticism should be directed instead to
formulations of trade secret law which have led courts to ex-
plain their conclusions by reference to inconsistent maxims
rather than clearly articulating the determinitive balance of
interests.
The first matrix illustrates the manner in which the policies
favoring trade secret protection vary greatly in strength in the
different cases. As one moves from left to right on the matrix,
the plaintiffs property interests become a less compelling basis
for trade secret protection. Similarly, as one moves from the
top to the bottom of the matrix, any breach of business ethics
becomes less compelling.
With respect to some of the situations illustrated, a discus-
sion of the circumstances which might weigh against trade se-
cret protection may be unnecessary. This is not because those
circumstances are unimportant, but because the need for trade
secret protection is either so strong or so weak that competing
interests will seldom be outcome determinative. Where the
defendant acquired the plaintiffs information by improper
means (the top row of the first matrix), the plaintiff should vir-
tually always obtain trade secret protection against the defend-
ant. While the line between proper and improper means is not
absolute, 6'2 acquisition by improper means is essentially an in-
tentional, wrongful "taking" by the defendant as opposed to a
disclosure in confidence by the plaintiff. A plaintiffs low-level
property interest in the information and/or the need to ensure
that legitimate competition by the defendant is not curtailed
may severely limit the scope of the remedy in some such cases.
However, the need to maintain business ethics is sufficiently
strong to justify some level of trade secret protection whenever
the trade secret has been intentionally taken.
Where the information has been acquired by proper means
by the defendant, but during a confidential relationship or
under an express understanding of confidentiality (the second
and third lines of the first matrix), it is important to consider
the strength of the competing considerations which favor per-
development of the informalion while employed by llectro-Craft and had not signed
trade secret agreements.
161. See, e.g., Note. supra note 1 I. at 996 (questioning courts' tendancies to "fill
back on the basic feel'" of the case).
162. See RI;STATEMENT (FIRS'T) or "I'TS § 757 comment F: Uniform Act, supra note
62, § I comments 1-5. at 541.
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mitting the defendant to utilize the information. The second
matrix illustrates the balance of competing interests in some
such circumstances.
Where the information has been disclosed or developed in
the course of an employer/employee relationship, the trade se-
cret protection afforded must not be so extensive that it unrea-
sonably impairs the ability of the employee to engage in his
chosen trade. 63 Similar considerations apply when the infor-
mation has been acquired or developed by a fabricator or in-
dependent contractor. 64 The court must consider those
factors which weigh in favor of permitting an employee or in-
dependent contractor to use the information in the course of
other pursuits. This includes consideration of the extent to
which the defendant's knowledge of the information is attribu-
table to his own level of experience and expertise, rather than
to a specific disclosure made to him by the plaintiff. 65 An-
other way of viewing this issue is to focus upon whether the
information, to the extent it relates to the plaintiff's product or
processes, is specific rather than general. 66 Arguably, how-
ever, the most significant factor is simply the extent to which
protection of the claimed trade secret will, in effect, restrict an
ex-employee's or independent contractor's freedom to con-
tinue working in his chosen trade or business. 67 In the em-
ployment context, this consideration is often characterized as a
determination of whether the information in question is some-
thing other than the general skill and experience of the em-
ployee which the employee is free to use elsewhere."!"
On the other hand, the right of an employee to utilize infor-
mation which courts characterize as his skill is not unlimited.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated that restrictions
163. Cudahy Co. v. American Laboratories, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (1).
Neb. 1970); Pressure Science, 413 F. Stipp. at 629; Koehring 254 F. Supp. at 338-39;
Stocker Hinge Mfg. Co. v. Darnell Indus. Inc., 61 Ill. App. 3d 636, 644, 377 N.E.2d
1125, 1131 (1978); Van Products. 419 Pa. 248, 261, 213 A.2d 769, 776.
164. See, e.g., RTE Corp. v. Coatings, 84 W.2d 105, 105 267 N.W.2d 226, 226
(1978); National Tile Board Corp. v. Panelboard Mfg. Co., 99 A.2d 440 (N.J. Super.
1953); Sarkes Taizian, 166 F. Stpp at 268.
165. See, e.g.. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 702. See generally Note, Developinents In Vie La.-
Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. RV. 888, 950-51 (1964): 2 I.. AI:rMAN, CALI.MANN UN-
FAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 14.24 (4th ed. 1982).
166. 'an Products, 419 Pa. 248, 261-62, 213 A.2d at 776-77.
167. 2 L. ALTMAN, CAI.I.MAN UNFAIR COMPETITION IRADEMARKS AND MONOI'OIES.
§ 14.24 (4th ed. 1982).
168. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 701-02; Miller, 298 N.W.2d at 459.
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should not fetter an employee's right to apply to his own best
advantage the skills and knowledge acquired by the overall ex-
perience of his previous employment, 69 even though they
may include "techniques which are . . . 'skillful variations of
general processes known to the particular trade.' "170 How-
ever, the same court has also pointed out that "knowledge
gained at an employer's expense, which takes on the character-
istics of a trade secret and which would be unfair for the em-
ployee to use elsewhere, is deemed confidential and is not to
be disclosed or used."' 7'
The freedom of an ex-employee or independent contractor
to carry on in his chosen trade is not only important to the
defendant, but to the interests of society in free competition
and the free flow of ideas, information and commerce. Thus,
in situations where the balance of competing interests creates a
close question, courts can be expected to favor the em-
ployee.172 In close cases, the courts are hesitant to restrain an
employee or independant contractor unless he clearly knew
that, in accepting access to, or creating, the trade secret during
his relationship with the plaintiff, he was accepting a restriction
upon his freedom to ply his trade.' 73 Arguably, in such situa-
tions the plaintiff can restrain an ex-employee or independent
contractor from using the confidential information in question
only under a valid secrecy or noncompete agreement. This is
the only way one can reconcile the suggestion of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in United Wild Rice that under some circum-
stances non-trade secret information may be protectable by
means of a written noncompete agreement 74 with that same
court's earlier statement that an employer could not use a
noncompete agreement to prevent an ex-employee from utiliz-
ing information which was no more than the skill of the
169. Miller, 298 N.W.2d at 459, quoting Reed. 40 N.Y.2d at 307, 353 N.E.2d at 593,
386 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
170. Id.
171. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 702.
172. For a recent example in a case involving an application for preliminary in-
junction under the Uniform Act, sec Plizer. Inc. v. IC I Americas Inc., No. 7785 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 21, 1984); see also. 'an Iroducls 419 Pa. 261. 213 A.2d 769: Sundstrand Corp.
v. Hydro-Tech Corp., 204 U.S..Q (BNA) 677 (D. Colo. 1979); c.J. Electro-CrIaft. 332
N.W.2d at 890.
173. See, e.g., Sh'ctaral Dy11amics, 401 F. S pp. at 1102; Motorola. 366 F. Stpp 1173;
c.f Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 890.
174. UInited Wlild Rice. 313 N.\V.2d at 634.
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Except in such close cases, the existence or lack of a restric-
tive employment agreement should not affect the outcome of a
case. Where the balance of interests weighs in favor of trade
secret protection, an employer is entitled to that protection
without such an agreement. Where the balance of interests
weighs against trade secret protection, an agreement which
would purport to provide such protection should be declared
void as against public policy. 71
Where the information in question has been developed by
the defendant as either an employee or an independent con-
tractor, the plaintiff will rarely be able to restrict its use by the
employee or contractor. One court has suggested that the em-
ployee who developes the information has a right equal to that
of his employer to use or disclose it for his own benefit.
1 77
Other courts have taken the position that the development of
the information by an employee-defendant is a compelling
consideration weighing against trade secret protection to the
employer. 1 78
Arguably, the employer can obtain protection against disclo-
sure or use by the one who actually developed the information
175. Miller, 298 N.W.2d at 459.
176. Because both the common law and the Uniform Act permit a duty of confi-
dentiality to be created by contract, see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 com-
ment j; UNIFORM ACT, supra note 62, at 555, commissioner's comment to § 7, the
courts have often failed to actually declare non-disclosure agreements void even
where the balance has weighed against protection. Nevertheless, they have usually
achieved this result, although sometimes at the risk of strained constructions of facts
or law. Good examples are a series of three decisions by the Indiana Court of Ap-
peals in two different cases brought by the same insurer against ex-employees. In
these decisions, the court of appeals went to great lengths to find that certain docu-
ments complied in whole or in part by the defendants while employed by the plaintiff
could not constitute a trade secret under the Uniform Act and also did not fall within
the scope of what appears to be two very comprehensive non-disclosure type agree-
ments. See, e.g., College Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Austin, 466 N.E.2d 738, 742 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984); Steenhoven v. College Life Ins. Co. of Am., 460 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984) (denying petitioner rehearing); Steenhoven v. College Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 458 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). It is clear, however, that no revision of
the insurer's non-disclosure agreement and/or showing that the documents in ques-
tion do not meet the liberal trade secret test contained in the Uniform Act will lead
the Indiana Court of Appeals to find this plaintiff is entitled to the protection it is
seeking against its ex-employees. The circumstances create a balance of interests
which weigh too strongly in favor of the employees. Since that message is implicit in
the court's decisions, there is no good reason that it is not expressed in the opinion.
177. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 582-83 160 A.2d 430, 437 (1960).
178. Sunstrand Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q (BNA) at 684. See, e.g.. Pressure Science, 413 F.
Supp. at 629; Cudahy, 313 F. Supp. at 1351.
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only if his property interest is compelling or if that interest is at
least reasonably substantial and he has a valid, written agree-
ment with the employee or independent contractor. In order
to have a valid agreement restraining an employee in Minne-
sota, the plaintiff-employer must have given real consideration
to the employee, 17 ' the agreement must be sufficiently spe-
cific, 80 and the employee must have fair notice of the extent of
the contractual restraint, either through the language of the
agreement or otherwise.8I
The matrices assume that the defendant knows of the rele-
vant circumstances at the time he acquires the information in
question. If he does not, he cannot be held accountable for
disclosure or use of the trade secret until he acquires such
knowledge. A difficult issue arises where a third party entre-
preneur pays value for the information or otherwise changes
his position before receiving notice that the one through
whom he obtained it has breached a duty of confidence or that
the plaintiff's rights have been infringed. Under the Restatement
view, there is no misappropriation under such circum-
stances. 18 2 Under the Uniform Act, use or disclosure after the
defendant has learned of the relevant circumstances consti-
tutes misappropriation in most instances. 813 Arguably, neither
of these results is totally appropriate. The better view is that
any use or disclosure by the defendant after he receives knowl-
edge of the relevant circumstances should constitute misap-
propriation, but the extent to which the defendant has given
value or otherwise changed his position prior to receiving such
knowledge should strongly influence the extent to which the
defendant can be enjoined and/or must pay a royalty or dam-
ages for further use.' 84 To a large extent, proposed amend-
ments to the Uniform Act would bring about this result. 85
179. SeeJostens, 318 N.W.2d at 703-04 (mere continuation of employment is not
enough).
180. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 903.
181. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 702 (citing R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS 79 (1953));Aries,
366 N.W.2d at 366.
182. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 758.
183. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 62, § 1, at 542.
184. See id. commissioners comment to § 2(b), at 545.
185. Amendments to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act were approved by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its annual conference
in August, 1985. The section on Damages was amended as follows:
(a) Except to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position
before to [sic] acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation
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C. What is the Nature and Extent of the Remedy to Which the
Plaintiff is Entitled?
Under both the common law'" and the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act,' 87 courts may fashion a remedy appropriate to the
specific trade secret misappropriation. The court's discretion,
however, should not be unlimited. In stark contrast to cases
like Jet Spray Cooler I8 and Aries Information Sys., Inc. v. Pacific
Management Sys. Corp., 189 other decisions have used rational
guidelines in fashioning an appropriate remedy under the
particular facts and circumstances of a given case. Similarly,
the Uniform Act and the comments thereto reflect a conscious
effort by the drafters to codify "the results of the better rea-
soned cases concerning remedies for trade secret
misappropriation."' l 90
As with other elements of trade secret claims, distortions
have occurred where courts have focused solely upon one of
the policies underlying trade secret protection when formulat-
ing the appropriate remedy. When courts have focused solely
upon maintaining business ethics, they have suggested that, as
long as a trade secret was initially misappropriated, any subse-
quent use by the defendant continues to be punishable regard-
less of whether anyone else could properly develop and use
that information. Such lopsided reasoning has led to perpet-
ual injunctions' 9' or an accounting for all of the defendant's
profits for over a decade 192 where the plaintiff was not using
the information and anyone, including the defendant, could
properly duplicate the same information without investing sub-
stantial time or effort.
renders a monetary recovery inequitable, a complainant is entitled to re-
cover damages for misappropriation. Damages include both loss caused by
misappropriation and unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is
not taken into account in computing the loss. In lieu of damages measured
by any other methods, damages caused by misappropriation may be mea-
sured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misap-
propriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.
Id. § 3(a) (West Supp. 1986).
186. See supra text accompanying note 86.
187. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 62, §§ 2-4.
188. 377 Mass. at 159, 385 N.E.2d at 1349.
189. 366 N.W.2d 366 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
190. UNIFORM ACT, supro note 62, Commissioner's Prefatory Note, at 537-38.
191. E.g., Elcor Chemical Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204, 214 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973).
192. Jet Spray, 377 Mass. at 183, 385 N.E.2d at 1363.
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Courts focusing solely upon the intellectual property ele-
ment of trade secret protection will view the objective as com-
pensating an aggrieved plaintiff for the difference in its
position before and after misappropriation.193 Under this
view, if a plaintiff cannot show damages in fact, he may not be
able to recover damages at all. 1,14 It might be possible to mea-
sure damages by the defendant's actual or constructive profits
resulting from the misappropriation, but only to the extent the
award is a reasonable approximation of lost profits suffered by
the plaintiff.19 5 This view does not take into account the unjust
enrichment which the defendant has gained, and which he
should disgorge regardless of the actual damage suffered by
the trade secret owner. 196
Since trade secret law has the dual aim of protecting intellec-
tual property interests and maintaining business ethics, an
award of compensatory damages should compensate the plain-
tiff and, at the same time, ensure that the defendant has dis-
gorged any unjust enrichment. o7  On the other hand, the
award should not result in a double recovery'" 8 or otherwise
193. Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1393 (4th Cir. 1971).
194. Basic Chemicals Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 233 (Iowa 1977); B & Y
Metal Painting v. Ball, 279 N.W.2d 813, 816-17 (Minn. 1979); cf Spery, 447 F.2d at
1393.
195. See B & YV4etal, 279 N.W.2d at 816-17; Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 81; cf. National
School Studies, Inc. v. Superior School Photo Serv., Inc., 40 Wash. 2d 263, 276, 242
P.2d 756, 763 (1952) (not using defendant's profit where methods of doing business
were dissimilar). In B & I Metal, discussing alternative means of measuring damages
for defendant's violation of a noncompete agreement, the court explained:
Although, as a general rule, damages for the breach of a covenant not to
compete are to be measured by the plaintiff's loss, not by the defendant's
gain, see generally, Annotation, 127 A.L.R. 1152, there are circumstances in
which the defendant's gain may be useful in determining the loss sustained by plain-
tiff. See Cherne Industrial, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81
(Minn. 1979); North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Moore, 275 Or. 359, 551 P.2d 431
(1976). In Cherne, we affirmed an award of damages based on the defend-
ant's gain from the violation of a covenant not to compete. In that case, how-
ever, the plaintiff's profit margin was only applied to that portion of the defendants'
gross income that derived from the plaintiffs former or prospective customers. In con-
trast, in the instant matter, B & I'did not undertake to prove what percentage of Ball's
gross sales were made to B & Y"s customers. There are about 10 other competi-
tors in the market, and undoubtedly some of Ball's sales are attributable to
business taken from these other competitors.
B & Y Metal, 279 N.W.2d at 816 (emphasis supplied).
196. As to awarding the defendant's unjust enrichment, see generally Annot., 170
A.L.R. 449, 491-92; Sperry Rand, 447 F.2d at 1392.
197. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 62, § 3 and commissioners' comment at 546-57.
198. For cases where there appear to have been double recoveries, see Cherne, 278
N.W.2d at 81 (damages awarded for wrongful use during the two year period the
information was a protectable trade secret coupled with a two year injunction); Aries,
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exceed the amount necessary to achieve this dual goal. Ac-
cordingly, an award of compensatory damages should be the
greater of the plaintiff's damages or the defendant's unjust en-
richment, rather than a recovery of both.
1 9
Recognition must also be given to the policies of free com-
petition and spread of technology, which limit a trade secret
owner's protectable interest to the lead time or "head start"
which his trade secret represents. Under either the common
law or the Uniform Act, injunctive relief and/or monetary re-
covery, whether measured by the plaintiff's loss or the defend-
ant's gain, should relate only to the period during which a
defendant would not have been able to develop his product or
process but for using the plaintiff's trade secret. This is the so-
called "head start" period.200  As explained by the Commis-
sioner's Comment to section 3 of the Uniform Act: "[a]ctual
damage to a complainant and unjust benefit to a misap-
propriator are caused by misappropriation during this time
alone." 2
0
Moreover, injunctive relief should be confined in scope to
prevent a defendant's use of only the trade secret.t 2 Similarly,
compensatory damages, even when measured by the defend-
ant's profits, should be limited to the actual or constructive
profit fairly attributable to the misappropriation of that infor-
mation which constitutes the plaintiff's trade secret. In in-
stances where a product or process is composed of many
components and only one component infringes upon a plain-
tiffs proprietary rights, the reasonable royalty standard20 3 is
366 N.W.2d at 366 (court approved the award of both plaintiffs lost revenues includ-
ing future royalties, and defendant's revenues during the period of misappropriation,
where defendant's revenues were apparently attributable to the same sales constitut-
ing the plaintiffs lost sales). See also UNIFORM ACT, supra note 62, § 3, at 541 and
commissioners' comment (discussing double counting in Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.,
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (declaring
"the Act adopts an express prohibition upon the counting of the same item as both a
loss to a complainant and an unjust benefit to a misappropriator").
199. See 2 R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 7.08[3], at 7-231; 2 L. ALT-
MAN, CALLMANN UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 14.45 (4th ed.
1982); Speny, 447 F.2d at 1392-93.
200. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 62, § 3, at 546-47 commissioners' comment; see also
Structural Dynamics, 401 F. Supp. at 1118; Carboline Co. v. Jarboe, 454 S.W.2d 540,
553 (Mo. 1970); 1 R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 7.08[3] at 7-228.
201. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 62, § 3, at 547 commissioners' comment.
202. See supra, note 33 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d
518, 536-37 (5th Cir. 1974); Structural Dynamics, 401 F. Supp. at 1120. This approach
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the appropriate means of apportioning profits when a profit
measure is warranted.
The appropriate method of applying a royalty measure is
demonstrated in Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering
Mechanics Research Corp.,2 14 where the plaintiff claimed misap-
propriation of trade secret computer programs. The Structural
Dynamics court first determined that a constructive profit mar-
gin of twenty percent was reasonable. It then reduced the fig-
ure to fifteen percent, so that the margin would reflect only the
portion of the defendant's software which the plaintiff's
software represented. The court then applied this reduced
margin to the gross receipts attributable to defendant's mar-
keting of its software during the head start period.
20 5
Both the common law and the Uniform Act recognize that,
in appropriate cases, punitive damages may be awarded. The
standard to be applied in determining whether punitive dam-
ages are to be awarded should be the same standard applied in
other areas of the law. 20 6 On the other hand, since the protec-
tion afforded trade secret owners is an exception to, and lim-
ited by, the policy encouraging the spread of technology, it is
important that the potential punitive damages a defendant
might face not be unlimited. Thus, the Uniform Act limits any
punitive damages to twice the amount of compensatory
damages .207
CONCLUSION
Absent the protections afforded by trade secret law, there
would be little incentive to invest in research and development
where the results may not be protectable by copyright or pat-
ent. As applied in the modern world of high technology, the
overriding social interest to be served by the law of trade
secrets should be to promote technological advance by encour-
aging investment in innovation and maintaining proper stan-
dards of business ethics without unduly hampering the ability
is precisely that used in patent infringement cases. See Broadview Chem. Corp. v.
Loctite Corp., 311 F. Supp. 447, 452 (D. Conn. 1970); Egry Register Co. v. Standard
Register Co., 23 F.2d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 1928).
204. 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
205. Id. at 1119-20.
206. In Minnesota, the common law standard has been codified. MINN. STAT.
§ 549.20 (1984).
207. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 62, § 3(b), at 546.
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of creative individuals to earn a living by working in their own
fields of expertise. In pursuit of that goal, courts must be care-
ful to maintain a proper balance between a developer's interest
in the exploitation of his own discovery, on the one hand, and
society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, informa-
tion, and commerce on the other.
This can best be done under a legal framework of trade se-
cret law which emphasizes the balance of policy interests to be
served, rather than considering the property and conduct as-
pects of any given case in artificial isolation. The court system
is adequately equipped to deal with the technical aspects of
trade secret cases involving new technology, and trade secret
law can serve as a flexible and yet reasonably uniform and pre-
dictable means of protecting legitimate interests in new tech-
nology if courts recognize and maintain this balance.
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